China's Invasion Barges Play Military Mind Games With Taiwan

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According to Dahm and Shugart, a single three-barge set can offload anything from light vehicles to 50-ton tanks. However, they point out that the narrow 6-meter-wide bridges limit throughput to single-lane, unidirectional traffic.

They estimate offloading a heavy combined arms battalion-about 150 vehicles-would take 40–60 minutes, making the barges valuable but potentially bottlenecked during high-intensity landings.

These throughput limits draw attention to China's larger sealift capability challenges. Dennis Blasko notes in an April 2022 CMSI report that despite modernization, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) operates only six amphibious combined arms brigades.

Blasko says this accounts for just 7% of the PLAGF's total brigade force and lacks the lift capacity needed to move an estimated 30,000 troops and more than 2,400 vehicles.

Blasko also says PLA exercises rarely exceed the battalion level and that most sea movement drills rely on civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries or limited PLAN support. Moreover, Blasko points out that China's amphibious brigades are geographically dispersed, meaning assembling them near embarkation points would require days or even weeks.

Yet, some analysts argue that China has already overcome key transport hurdles. Thomas Shugart writes in an October 2022 War on the Rocks article that China's sealift capacity is no longer a critical limitation. He argues that China's use of civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and vehicle carriers significantly augments its military transport capability.

Shugart notes that China's civilian shipping now offers over 2.4 million tons of transport capacity, far surpassing the PLAN's amphibious fleet. He asserts these vessels, designed for fast loading and unloading, could deliver eight heavy brigades and 60,000 troops in an initial wave, with more reinforcements in the following days.

Ian Easton notes in a July 2021 Project 2049 report that Taiwan has 14 beaches suitable for amphibious landings. Bloomberg adds that these locations are well-defended and surrounded by rough terrain and military installations.

Bloomberg also notes that barricades may hinder access. Still, Newsweek reported in December 2023 that more cautious defense analysts believe there could be close to two dozen viable landing sites.

Yet operational viability also depends on environmental conditions. Andrew Erickson writes in an April 2025 article for 1945 that Shuiqiao barges are limited in rough weather and adverse beach conditions. Erickson says the platforms have only been observed in calm waters, suggesting their use may be confined to favorable environments.

Erickson adds that even if the barges deliver vehicles to shore, they do not assist with moving them inland. Poorly located landing sites or inadequate road access could negate any tactical advantage.

More critically, the PLA's ability to establish and hold a beachhead would face fierce resistance. Ralph Bentley writes in a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that Taiwan's defense strategy focuses on denying China a landing foothold. Bentley says Taiwan uses dense littoral defenses, including naval mines, coastal engineering, mobile anti-ship missiles and long-range artillery.

Bentley emphasizes that these tools are designed to attrit Chinese amphibious forces before they can consolidate ashore. He notes that this strategy focuses on destroying vulnerable transport ships as they cross or approach the Strait.